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Signaling and Precedent in Federal District
Court Opinions
Andrew P. Morriss*, Michael Heise * and Gregory C. Sisk***
Standard economic analysis of judicial behavior, at least with
respect to federal judges, has to some extent foundered on the
apparent success of the Constitution's framers in designing an
institution where almost the whole thrust of the rules govern-
ing compensation and other terms and conditions of judicial
employment is to divorce judicial action from incentives.
That is, the structure takes away the carrots and sticks and
the different benefits and costs associated with different be-
haviors which inform human action in an economic model.
Nonetheless, our earlier empirical work, as well as work by
others, found significant associations between promotion po-
tential and judicial decision making in the federal district
bench. This earlier work left unclear, however, how district
judges might use their positions to enhance their opportuni-
ties for advancement. In this paper we examine how federal
judges can use the content and outcome of their decisions to
signal that they would be appropriate candidates for eleva-
tion to a higher court. We first develop a framework that ex-
plains how judges can use decisions and opinions to signal to
appointing authority. We then test the theory through a de-
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tailed examination of federal district judges' behavior in their
decisions on the constitutionality of the sentencing guidelines
during the "Sentencing Guidelines Crisis of 1988." Examining
judges' decisions to rule through a written opinion, we find
evidence supporting the signaling hypothesis. Judges were
more likely to use written opinions to communicate their rul-
ings in Sentencing Guidelines cases where the potential for
promotion to the circuit court of appeal was greater. We also
find that precedent influences outcome but not the particular
reasons judges articulate for their decisions
I. INTRODUCTION
That judges' self-interest might influence judicial opinions often has
been neglected in the research literature.' Economic analysis of judi-
cial behavior, at least with respect to federal judges, has to some ex-
tent foundered on the apparent success of the Framers of the Consti-
tution in successfully designing an institution where
almost the whole thrust of the rules governing compensation and
other terms and conditions of judicial employment is to divorce
judicial action from incentives-to take away the carrots and
sticks, the different benefits and costs associated with different
behaviors, that determine human action in an economic model.2
Nonetheless, our earlier empirical work3 as well as work by others4
found significant associations between promotion potential and ju-
dicial decision making in the federal district bench. This earlier work
left unclear, however, how district judges might use their positions to
enhance their opportunities for advancement. In this paper we exam-
ine how federal judges can use the content and outcome of their de-
cisions to signal that they would be appropriate candidates for eleva-
tion to a higher court. We first develop a framework that explains how
Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of
Judicial Behavior, 68 U Cinc L Rev 615, 615 (2000).2 Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else
Does), 3 Sup Ct Econ Rev 1, 1 (1993). See also Richard A. Epstein, The Independence
of Judges: The Uses and Limitation of Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L Rev 827
(1990).
' Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences
on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 NYU L Rev 1377
(1998).
1 Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence from Antitrust Sen-
tencing, 12 Int Rev L & Econ 13 (1992); Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior
or What's "Unconstitutional" about the Sentencing Commission? 7 J L, Econ, & Org
183(1991).
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judges can use decisions and opinions to signal to appointing author-
ity. We then test the theory through a detailed examination of federal
district judges' behavior in their decisions on the constitutionality of
the sentencing guidelines during the "Sentencing Guidelines Crisis
of 1988."
Examining judges' decisions to rule through a written opinion,
we find evidence supporting the signaling hypothesis. Judges were
more likely to use written opinions to communicate their rulings in
Sentencing Guidelines cases where the potential for promotion to
the court of appeals was greater. We also find that precedent influ-
ences outcome but not the particular reasons judges articulate for
their decisions.
II. PROMOTING JUDGES
The judiciary in the United States is organized in a series of parallel,
hierarchical structures. At the top of the federal system in terms of
prestige, compensation, and power is the United States Supreme
Court, followed by the Federal Courts of Appeals, the Federal District
Courts, and assorted specialized and subordinate judicial positions
(the Court of Federal Claims, Magistrate Judges, Bankruptcy Judges,
and similar positions). Table 1 lists federal judicial positions, their
number, their terms, and their salaries.5
Although attaining a promotion within the federal judicial system
requires different things at different levels and at different times, ap-
pointment to higher positions in the federal system is largely a polit-
ical process. All appointments at the district court level and above are
formally made by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. Appointments to the federal district bench have traditionally
been made subject to a large degree of deference to political leaders in
the state where the judge will sit.6 Appointments to the courts of ap-
peals feature a lesser but still positive degree of deference to political
leaders for the state in which the judge sits, although a circuit judge
will have authority over a multi-state geographic region.7 Finally ap-
pointments to the U.S. Supreme Court are the most politicized and,
at least in recent years, reflect interest group pressure at the national
- State judiciaries are organized in a roughly similar fashion, with the most promi-
nent differences being that a substantial minority of states lack an intermediate ap-
pellate court and two states (Texas and Oklahoma) have parallel courts of last resort for
civil and criminal law issues. (State judges are also selected in a variety of ways and
have different term lengths.)
6 Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt
Through Reagan 13 (Yale, 1997).
7 Id.
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Table 1. Federal Judicial Positions in 1988
Position Number Compensation Appointed By Term
Chief Justice, 1 $115,000 President Life
Supreme Court
Associate Justice, 8 $110,000 President Life
Supreme Court
Judge, Circuit Court 179 $95,000 President Life
of Appeals
District Judge (including 655 $89,500 President Life
temporary seats)
Bankruptcy Judge 309 $72,500 Circuit Court 14 years,
of Appeal renewable
Judges
Magistrate Judge 292 full $72,500 District Court 8 years,
time (full time) Judges renewable
(full time);
164 part 4 years
time renewable
(part time)
level. Interest groups are increasingly playing a role in appointments
to the lower courts as well.
Because the number of judicial positions declines sharply as one
ascends the ladder of prestige in the federal system, the number of op-
portunities for promotion also declines sharply. Accordingly we focus
here on the promotion of federal district judges to the federal appel-
late courts. 8 There are 179 circuit court judgeships and 655 district
court judgeships in the United States today. Circuit court vacancies
need not be filled from the district court bench, but they often are.
During most of the circuit courts of appeals' existence, between forty
to sixty percent of federal circuit appointees have prior experience as
a federal district judge.' In the 1980s, the period covered by our data,
the percentage was around 38%. °1O Although there are relatively few
circuit judgeships available compared to district judgeships (a roughly
constant ratio of 1:3.5 has existed for some time), there are enough va-
cancies that promotion remains a real possibility for most district
judges. In circuits where a vacancy exists or is likely to exist, promo-
tion is a distinct possibility for district judges.
s District judges could be promoted directly to the Supreme Court, without first
serving on the appellate bench, and several have been mentioned on short lists for ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court in recent years, although none were nominated.
9 Daniel Klerman, Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence, 72 So Cal L Rev 455,
460(1999).
10 Id.
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There are many paths to judicial selection and promotion. Politi-
cal appointments in general are often awarded based on partisan po-
litical services. Once on the federal bench, however, partisan activi-
ties are generally not available to a judge desiring promotion since the
rules governing federal judges forbid political activity. While prior po-
litical service or connections can still help, the potential for political
service while on the bench is severely limited. Judicial ethics also for-
bid the public discussion of how a judge will vote in a particular type
of case that might arise in the future, leading to somewhat bizarre
proceedings in confirmation hearings in which nominees attempt to
establish that they have not considered particular politically charged
issues enough to have prejudged the issues." While the signals sent
before appointment to a district court position are capable of influ-
encing the appointing authority, additional signals from political ac-
tivity are not available in the competition for appointment to a higher
court. District court judges are thus limited in their ability to com-
pete for circuit court of appeals vacancies through the type of signals
they used to obtain their district court appointments.12
Within the context of their judicial role, however, judges have reg-
ular opportunities to signal their qualifications for promotion through
their judicial decisions. Popular and scholarly accounts of judicial
nominations suggest that opinions are carefully screened before pro-
moting a lower court judge.' 3 Discussions of judicial appointments
often center on the alleged use of "litmus tests" for screening poten-
tial judicial candidates, particularly with respect to abortion. For ex-
ample, abortion rights pressure groups demand that potential judges
swear allegiance to Roe v. Wade while pro-life pressure groups insist
on a commitment to overturning that decision. Since potential judges
cannot openly discuss how they would handle such questions in the
future, people involved in selection processes both within and with-
" Neil A. Lewis, Eating His Words, Houston Chronicle 22 (December 29, 1991).
12 A decision which attracts attention from the nominating authority may also at-
tract unwelcome attention from opponents of the President in the Senate. We do not
think such considerations would prevent judges from making use of opinions as sig-
nals. Given the substantial competition for the limited number of appellate court po-
sitions, the wise judge will see that it is vital to draw the attention of the administra-
tion in whatever way reasonably possible, leaving concerns about opposition in the
Senate to another day. In other words, it indeed is the door to nomination that is most
difficult to get through, so more energy and attention will be focused on that stage.
Further, only forty percent of vacant circuit judgeships in recent years were filled from
the ranks of district court judges, while the vast majority of circuit nominees were con-
firmed in the 1980s. The critical step is thus, we believe, attracting executive branch
attention, not remaining a stealth candidate for the confirmation process.
'3 Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L Rev 309
(1996).
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out the government often turn to candidates' records, particularly
past decisions, for clues as to how a judge will behave in the future."4
(Outside writings, of course, also play a role, as Robert Bork discov-
ered to his chagrin.)
One difficulty with promotion potential as a variable is that it op-
erates unevenly across judges. Experiences for district and appellate
judges differ widely. Although an appellate judgeship pays more and
carries more prestige, being a federal appellate judge is a more iso-
lated experience than being a federal district judge. Appellate judges
have contact primarily with other appellate judges and the various
judges' law clerks and staffs. District judges, on the other hand, have
regular contact with the bar and members of the public. Appellate
judges decide cases largely based on written materials (briefs and
memos), with comparatively brief oral arguments. Chambers confer-
ences with their clerks are their primary chance to interact with non-
judges on a case. District judges spend considerable time in the court-
room and conferences with lawyers. There are thus some, and perhaps
a substantial number, of district judges who would not be willing to
serve as appellate judges.' 5 Unlike the opportunity for additional
monetary compensation, therefore, the incentive of a "promotion" to
the circuit court is not universally desired. Taking this into account
strengthens the impact on those district judges desiring promotion-
removing half the pool of potential competitors for promotion, for
example, would double the opportunities for promotion. Because we
could construct no way to measure whether any particular district
judge desired promotion, we are forced to set aside the unevenness
of the desire for promotion in our empirical analysis below. Since we
find significant evidence of the influence of promotion potential
despite this diluting consideration, we do not believe this is a prob-
lem here, although it merits further analysis and consideration in fu-
ture studies.
Signals sent through opinions are not costless, of course. Writing
an opinion that both decides a legal issue and sends an appropriate
signal may be more difficult than writing one that only resolves the
issue. Signals must be carefully crafted, for opinions will be analyzed
by not only the appointing authority but by the president's opponents
14 See Jonathan L. Entin, The Confirmation Process and the Quality of Political De-
bate, 11 Yale L & Pol Rev 407 (1993), for a discussion of the rise of the ideological
model of the confirmation process at the Supreme Court level.
"s District judges have the opportunity to experience the appellate lifestyle on oc-
casion by sitting on appellate panels "by designation" to provide the relevant circuit
court of appeals with additional personnel. Some district judges seek such opportuni-
ties while others actively avoid them.
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in the Senate, who will be searching for nominees who can be de-
feated. This scrutiny requires care in drafting and lifts opinion writ-
ing out of the "cheap talk" signal category.
III. JUDICIAL UTILITY FUNCTIONS
Posner posits a judicial utility function based on the utility derived
from the acts of judging, leisure, moonlighting, reputation, and other
sources of judicial utility such as popularity among lawyers, prestige,
and avoiding reversal. 16 Adding the potential for promotion and util-
ity from creating a precedent, we write a federal district judge's util-
ity as
U = U (If, IUt'), t,, ti, R, C, P, 0)
where judicial income (I) is represented by fixed (judicial salary) and
variable components (outside income from moonlighting), time
spent on leisure (t,), time spent on judging (ti), reputation (R), poten-
tial for promotion to the circuit court (C), creation of a precedent (P),
and other components (0). We further assume that judges allocate
their time so that they maximize their utility, making the marginal
utility from the last hour devoted to judging equal to the marginal
utility of the last hour devoted to leisure. 7
In evaluating the decision to write an opinion in a particular case,
we can narrow the focus of the utility function considerably. In par-
ticular, to simplify the model we assume that the decision to write a
specific opinion (as opposed to the decision to write an additional
opinion) will not have an impact on judicial income, moonlighting,
time spent on other aspects of judging, or leisure time. 8 The utility
derived from writing opinion i can therefore be represented by
U(w,) = U(R(wi), C(wi, P(w ))
making the utility from writing opinion i depend only on the opin-
ion's influence on the judge's reputation, its creation of a precedent
16 Posner, 3 Sup Ct Econ Rev at 31-34 (cited in note 2).
Id at 31.
We think this is a reasonable assumption. Although opinion writing is a sub-
stantial part of judging, judges' time budgets are soft, so that time spent writing opin-
ions need not affect the work/leisure trade-off. For example, since district judges have
virtually unlimited authority over their schedules, even an opinion that proved time-
consuming to write need not affect the judging/leisure tradeoff as other cases could
simply be shifted into the future. Of course a judge who engaged in prolific opinion
writing beyond the norm for judges at his or her level would have to make other trade-
offs. The potential for enhanced income from promotion is assumed to be subsumed
within C.
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that fits with the judge's policy preferences, and its impact on the po-
tential for promotion.
For federal district judges, we believe we can narrow the focus still
more. The impermanence of district court opinions reduces the im-
pact of the role of precedent on judicial utility.19 District judges face
the constraint of review by a higher court; Supreme Court justices do
not. (Supreme Court opinions are, of course, "reviewed" through ac-
ademic criticism, but there is little evidence that they are ever "re-
versed" in a meaningful way through that avenue.) Although this
constraint is always present for lower court judges, it is more probable
in some cases (those with constitutional issues, for example) that
they will be reviewed. Precedent that rests on district court opinions
is particularly fragile-no court must follow it and the opportunities
to overturn it are frequent. To be sure, the persuasive value of prece-
dent on other district judges may encourage preparation of written
decisions designed to convince other judges facing the same issues to
reach the same conclusions. Indeed, our prior study found strong ev-
idence of the persuasive impact of sentencing guidelines constitu-
tionality decisions upon other judges. 0 However, that differs from
the Posnerian utility function's implicit assumption that precedent is
a means of gaining utility by embedding personal policy preferences
in the law. Moreover, the more significant the precedent, the more
fragile it is, as the incentives for the losing parties to appeal and ap-
pellate court judges to impose their own views grow with the impor-
tance of the rule. Because circuit court opinions are more likely to es-
tablish lasting precedents, the utility from establishing a legal rule
will play a larger role in analysis of those judges' behavior. At the trial
court level, however, we believe we can safely ignore the legally con-
trolling nature of precedent, at least in notorious disputes.
Precedent operates in a second way as well, however. District judges
write not just to encode their views in the law but to persuade others.
Particularly in cases like these, involving constitutional questions
that the Supreme Court would decide in the near future, establishing
a binding precedent cannot be the reason for writing. Seeking to per-
suade others, however, provides a motive for writing. Measuring the in-
tensity of the desire to persuade is unfortunately not possible. The cir-
cumstances of our data allow us to set this concern aside here. Given
19 Lower courts do have opportunities to create precedents that, at least until re-
viewed by higher courts, also establish meaningful new legal rules. Federal district
judges, for example, played a significant role in the evolution of Pennsylvania employ-
ment law through their decisions in diversity cases. See Mark R. Kramer, Comment:
The Role of Federal Courts in Changing State Law: The Employment At Will Doctrine
in Pennsylvania, 133 U Pa L Rev 227 (1984).
20 Sisk, Heise & Morriss, 73 NYU L Rev at 1493-1498 (cited in note 3).
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the importance of the issue for district judges, 2' and the presence of
background variables that control for the demographic factors we hy-
pothesized might be related to the intensity of feeling (e.g. experience
as a prosecutor or defense attorney), we assumed that, after control-
ling for demographics, the judges in our data set all experienced the
benefit of communicating their views to the Supreme Court equally.
Further, because we have captured some of what might be labeled
reputation above and in our promotion potential variable discussed
below, we can discount for the present purposes the separate influ-
ence of decisions on individual reputation as well. A trial judge's rep-
utation depends on many things-his decisions, demeanor in court,
reputation for fairness, length of docket, and so on. The influence of
any given written opinion on reputation so defined independent of
the opinion's service as a signal is therefore likely to be small, even an
opinion on an important issue such as the sentencing guidelines.
We have now reduced the decision to write an opinion to its influ-
ence on the potential for promotion. 22 The potential for promotion is
a function of the probability that a vacancy exists or will occur soon,
for which the judge is eligible and the judge's suitability for the pro-
motion. For simplicity, assume that suitability is a linear sum of the
number of opinions in which the judge has taken the "right" position
from the point of view of the appointing authority. We can thus write
the probability of promotion as
Pr(Promotion) = (7 wi) * Pr(Vacancy)
In this simple model, the marginal value of writing opinion i will
therefore be the increase it produces in the probability of promotion:
aPr(Promotion) / a(wi) = Pr(vacancy)
The higher the probability of a vacancy in the relevant higher court
therefore, the greater the value of opinion i, if opinion i takes the
"correct" position. This is an empirically testable hypothesis. Note
that we assume, as we necessarily must for modeling purposes, that
district judges have uniform and positive views of the desirability of
promotion.
We now turn to the question of whether district court opinions can
serve as signals. In Spence's (1974) seminal work on signaling, 3 he
concluded that market signaling games can be divided into two types.
21 Id.
22 Some readers may wonder, therefore, why we discussed the other components of
the judicial utility function. We found that when we did not, readers suggested that we
had neglected these components. We include this discussion to explain why we believe
those components are not meaningfully present in this instance.
23 Michael A. Spence, Market Signaling (Harvard, 1974).
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In the first, the focus of Spence's original model, the game involves
relatively large numbers of people in the market at any given time and
relative infrequency of any one individual's appearance in the market.
Under these conditions, individuals do not invest in signaling credi-
bility because the benefits of doing so are not appreciable.24 In the
second type of signaling game, where players are relatively few and
signals relatively plentiful, individuals invest in reputations because
they can appropriate the gains from signaling.25
The market for promotion among federal district judges is an ex-
ample of the second type of signaling. The number of potential ap-
pointees to the circuit bench is small, even if all district judges were
considered as eligible. (Non-judges are also eligible, of course.) Dis-
trict judges have numerous opportunities to signal through opinion
writing, although some opinions will obviously be better signals than
others.26 Despite their low physical production cost, we do not be-
lieve judicial opinions qualify as "cheap talk."27 As noted above, the
signals sent are received by both the appointing and the confirming
authorities, whose interests are often dissimilar. There is thus a real
cost to a signal that lifts it above "cheap talk." That is, a judge must
weigh the possibility that the signal the judge sends may harm the
chance for confirmation as well as attract the attention necessary for
nomination. As noted earlier, we do not believe such a cost is so high
as to prevent judges from sending signals in opinions but it is suffi-
cient to render opinions more than merely "cheap talk!'
Judicial decisions have two components. First, decisions are deci-
sions-that is judges decide legal questions. (Posner suggests that the
frequency of opportunities to "vote" through decisions is a key ele-
ment of the utility of the time spent judging.28 ) Second, judges also
sometimes issue opinions explaining their decisions. Judges thus
have a choice in deciding cases about what sort of signal they wish to
send. A judge could opt for a decision without an opinion or a deci-
sion with an opinion.
While opinions can serve as a signal, both the legal decision made
24 Id at 107.
25 Id at 110.
26 Judges can tradeoff the signal quality of their opinion and their desire to create an
outcome they prefer in a particular case. District court decisions on factual matters are
reviewed under a highly deferential standard while district court legal decisions are de-
cided de novo on appeal. In many cases, outcomes can be "protected" by cloaking them
in decisions on the credibility of witnesses and the like, rather than on the law. Fact-
bound decisions, however, send a far noisier signal about judges' views of the law and
suitability for promotion.
27 Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10 J Econ Persp 103 (1996).
28 Posner, 3 Sup Ct Econ Rev at 15-18 (cited in note 2).
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and the judicial opinion itself convey information about the deciding
judge. In many instances, the opinion contains more information than
decision itself. For example, in deciding a constitutional law question,
a judge can employ a variety of reasoning approaches to resolving
textual ambiguities, and these methods of reasoning may predict fu-
ture decisions. Thus the Reagan Administration, at least in its Supreme
Court appointments, sought to appoint judges committed to origi-
nalism in interpretation. Alternatively, a more liberal president might
seek to appoint judges committed to the "living constitution" ap-
proach advocated by the late Justice William Brennan.29 Of course, an
existing judicial record is no guarantee against a post-appointment
conversion, as appears to have happened with President Nixon's ap-
pointment of Harry Blackmun to the Supreme Court. Nevertheless
opinions' content does provide some signal of future behavior.
An opinion's content is a particularly important signal in two cir-
cumstances. First, many legal questions are readily resolved by resort
to binding precedent. No matter how strongly a lower court judge
may feel, for example, that Roe v. Wade was incorrectly decided, he
or she is still bound by the Supreme Court's opinion in that case un-
til the Supreme Court reverses it. A pro-life judge may therefore be re-
quired by Roe and its progeny to strike a particular legislative restric-
tion on abortion regardless of the judge's own preferences. An opinion,
however, can signal that the judge carefully explored the opportuni-
ties for striking a law before, reluctantly, concluding that he or she is
bound by precedent. 30 Where a binding precedent is controversial,
therefore, judges might make use of opinions to signal their disagree-
ment with the substance of the precedent, even while they signal
their willingness as lower court judges to follow precedent until they
have the opportunity to overturn the particular precedent on a higher
court. Many cases, of course, do not allow much potential for send-
ing a signal. Resolving a routine, fact-dependent discovery motion,
for example, would be likely to tell a reader little about a judge's phi-
losophy on constitutional issues.
Second, some cases involve legal questions for which there are no
29 William J. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Rati-
fication, in Alpheus T. Mason and Donald G. Stephenson, eds, American Constitu-
tional Law (Prentice Hall 8th ed, 1987).
30 See Margaret S v Edwards, 794 F2d 994 (5th Cir 1986), in which Fifth Circuit
Judge Patrick Higginbotham highlighted criticism of Roe v. Wade but concluded that
he was constrained by Roe to strike the statute in question. Ironically, anti-abortion
groups misread Higginbotham's signal and may have torpedoed his chances for a Su-
preme Court nomination based on the decision, apparently without reading the opin-
ion. See Neal Devins, Through the Looking Glass: What Abortion Teaches Us About
American Politics, 94 Colum L Rev 293, 323 (1994).
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obvious answers dictated by binding precedent. The cases on which
we base our empirical analysis below are good examples of that: the
question of whether the mandatory service of judges on a presiden-
tially appointed commission violated the Constitution's requirement
of separation of powers had never been addressed by the Supreme
Court and the existing precedents were ambiguous. 31 Here a judge's
opinion can signal not only his legal craftsmanship but the compati-
bility of his approach with the appointing authority's preferences.
Both opinions and decisions therefore have the potential to serve
as signals. The effectiveness of either will vary with the type of case-
opinions in abortion rights cases are much more likely to signal the
deciding judges' views than are decisions, because the Supreme Court
has removed much of lower courts' discretion through its own opin-
ions. Sentences in criminal cases, as Cohen found in criminal anti-
trust cases, are better signals of "toughness on crime" than are opin-
ions on the appropriateness of a particular sentence.3 2
Our theory suggests, therefore, that district judges will be more
likely to write in cases that send clear signals about their suitability
for promotion and be more likely to write when opportunities for pro-
motion are greater. Before turning to the data, however, we must de-
scribe the legal controversy on which our empirical results rest.
IV. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES CRISIS
OF 1988
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA") revolutionized the sen-
tencing of convicted criminals in the federal courts. During the de-
bate on the Sentencing Guidelines produced by the Sentencing Com-
mission pursuant to the SRA, for example, Representative Mike
Synar described the Guidelines as "rewrit[ing] the face of sentencing
in this country as we know it, and have known it for over 200 years.''33
Prior to the SRA (and for several years after it, while the implement-
ing regulations were being created), federal judges exercised an enor-
mous amount of discretion in sentencing. Federal criminal statutes
provided federal district judges with only loose constraints on their
decision making, typically allowing a large range of possible sen-
tences. This led to large apparent disparities in sentencing-for ex-
ample, a study by the Comptroller General of the United States ex-
amined sentences given by the United States district courts for the
year ending June 30, 1977 and found that the longest average sentence
31 Sisk, Heise & Morriss, 73 NYU L Rev at 1400-1401 (cited in note 3).
32 Cohen, 12 Int Rev L & Econ 1377 (cited in note 4).
33 133 Congressional Record 26, 372 (1987).
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for bank robbery was 17.9 years, whereas the shortest average sen-
tence was seven years. 3
4
The SRA eliminated substantially all of federal district judges' dis-
cretion in sentencing, shifting much of it to federal prosecutors in
the view of the critics.35 In place of the numerous permissible bases
for sentences and wide range of possible sentences, the Guidelines is-
sued under the SRA created an extremely narrow range of sentences.
Under the Guidelines, sentences for particular offenses are depend-
ent largely on the severity of the offense and the defendant's criminal
history. The Guidelines also sharply limited the reasons for which a
judge can depart from that narrow range, and granted a right of appeal
of sentences to the prosecution. (They also eliminated parole and made
other changes.) Judges have compared their roles under the Guide-
lines to that of notary publics and accountants.36
The Guidelines provoked a negative reaction from many federal
judges.37 Eighty-six percent of federal judges polled by the Federal Ju-
dicial Center in 1992 wanted more discretion restored to judges in
sentencing.35 Second Circuit (and former U.S. District) Judge Jose
Cabranes and his wife, Yale law professor Kate Stith, both leading
critics of the Guidelines, recently wrote that the Commission has
transformed "the venerable ritual of sentencing to a puppet theater
in which defendants are not persons, but kinds of persons-abstract
entities to be defined by a chart, their concrete existence systemati-
cally ignored and thus nullified. ' 39 The Guidelines have not, more-
over, eliminated the controversy over disparities in sentencing, but
merely shifted the issue to whether such disparities exist with re-
spect to departures from the Guidelines. 40
The Guidelines themselves were created, and continue to be main-
tained, by a controversial body, the United States Sentencing Com-
mission. The Commission consists of seven voting members, at least
three of whom are required to be sitting federal judges chosen from a
pool of six judges nominated by the Judicial Conference of the United
34 Comptroller General, Report to the Congress of the United States, Reducing Fed-
eral Judicial Sentencing and Prosecuting Disparities: A Systematic Approach Needed
9(1979).
35 Kate Stith and Jose A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the
Federal Courts 130 (Chicago, 1999).36 Id at 83.
31 Id at 5.
38 Joan Biskupic and Mary Pat Flaherty, Justice By The Numbers, Wash Post Al
(Tuesday, October 8, 1996).
39 Stith and Cabranes, Fear of Judging at 84 (cited in note 35).
40 Harvey Berkman, Disparities Still Alive Under Sentencing Guidelines, 20(3) Nat
L J A10 (September 15, 1997); David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Dispari-
ties in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J L & Econ 285 (2001).
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States. All the members are chosen by the president and confirmed
by the Senate. The members serve six year terms and are removable
for cause by the president. The SRA denominated the Commission as
"an independent commission in the judicial branch of the United
States," a unique status without constitutional precedent. 41
Although the SRA was passed in 1984, it took the Commission a
few years to organize and compile the Guidelines, issuing its final
proposed Guidelines in April 1987. The SRA provided for a six month
delay to allow Congress to review the proposed Guidelines and the
Guidelines thus went into effect on November 1, 1987. They apply to
most federal crimes committed after that date. Although many fed-
eral judges had opposed the Guidelines, the initial reaction to the fi-
nal proposal was "muted" as the revisions made to interim drafts had
"seemingly mollified" many critics. 42 Because challenges to the con-
stitutionality of the Guidelines could not occur until the Guidelines
were actually applied to determine a sentence, the first constitu-
tional challenges began to appear in early 1988 when the first defen-
dants charged with commission of a crime committed after Novem-
ber 1, 1987, were sentenced.
The criminal defense bar challenged the Guidelines' constitution-
ality on four grounds. First, defense lawyers charged that the SRA vi-
olated the constitution's requirement of separation of powers by plac-
ing the Commission, a body which exercised nonjudicial rulemaking
powers in constructing the Guidelines, in the judicial branch. Sec-
ond, defense lawyers argued that the requirement that three mem-
bers of the Commission be sitting federal judges violated the separa-
tion of powers, particularly since the president could remove them
from the Commission. Third, the defense bar attacked the Commis-
sion's authority to promulgate the Guidelines as an improper delega-
tion of Congressional power. Fourth, the defense bar argued that the
Guidelines violated a constitutional due process right to individual-
ized sentencing. (The specifics of the legal arguments are discussed
in detail in our earlier paper43)
The most important feature of these attacks (and the responses by
the government's lawyers) for our purpose is that the arguments were
made in virtual cookie cutter fashion in case after case. The merits of
the legal arguments all turned on the structure of the SRA, not on the
facts of the criminal convictions in individual cases. There was thus no
significant factual variation from case to case. Moreover, the defense bar
41 This status was largely driven by the fear that the Supreme Court would strike
down the Commission if it was placed outside the judiciary and to make the reforms
appear less radical. Stith and Cabranes, Fear of Judging at 45 (cited in note 35).
42 Id at 57.
43 Sisk, Heise & Morriss, 73 NYU L Rev at 1396-1406 (cited in note 3).
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circulated a model brief for use by defense counsel and a small group of
government attorneys argued the government case, using briefs whose
legal arguments did not change substantially from case to case.
The cases thus present an almost ideal natural experiment in
which the judges involved were presented with virtually identical le-
gal questions. Even better, these legal questions were real legal ques-
tions, unlike the hypotheticals used in some simulations. 44 Because of
the certainty of prompt Supreme Court review, 45 the Guidelines cases
also lack any element of a judge attempting to maximize his or her
utility by creating a legal rule that satisfied personal preferences. 46
Since the Supreme Court decision would apply to all criminal cases
still pending in the trial court or on appeal, the decisions of the dis-
trict judges would not ultimately govern even the case before them.
One further feature of the legal debate over the Guidelines makes
these cases particularly useful. The Reagan Administration was deeply
divided over how to respond to the constitutional challenges to the
Guidelines. Although President Reagan had signed the SRA in 1984,
the Administration was ambivalent over the issue of the location of
the Commission and whether the location violated the separation of
powers. Consequently, the Administration took the position that
while locating the Commission in the judicial branch was in fact un-
constitutional, the Commission could be saved by the courts' sever-
ing of that one section out of the SRA, relocating the Commission to
the executive branch. The Sentencing Commission itself, however,
took the position that the SRA was constitutional without such judi-
cial action. As a result, two sets of lawyers responded to each defen-
dant's challenge: one from the Department of Justice and one from
the Sentencing Commission. This division allowed us to make a
deeper exploration of the separation of powers issues and increased
the opportunity for judges to signal their suitability for promotion.
44 See Sisk, Heise & Morriss, 73 NYU L Rev at 1385-96 (cited in note 3), for a de-
tailed description of prior studies and their problems.
4s The circumstances of the Guidelines cases in our database left no doubt in any-
one's mind that the question of the constitutionality of the Guidelines and the Com-
mission would be resolved in short order by the U.S. Supreme Court, making the lifes-
pan of a district court decision as capital certain to be short. Although the Supreme
Court has the discretion to dodge, and often does dodge, important legal and constitu-
tional issues by declining to review cases that raise those issues, the chaos created by
the Guidelines Crisis did not leave that as an option. Federal sentencing of convicted
criminals is a high volume business-almost forty-four thousand defendants were
convicted in federal courts in 1987, the year immediately prior to the Guidelines tak-
ing effect. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1989. Table 307 at 179. The system
could not tolerate uncertainty over the constitutionality of that many sentences.
46 Judges might, however, have gained some utility from the decision. Judges who
found the Guidelines distasteful, for example, might have derived pleasure, however
transient, from striking the Guidelines.
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The existing legal precedents on the challenges to the Guidelines
left considerable room for district judges to make up their own minds.
On the major challenges under separation of powers theory, there was
plenty of latitude for argument that either result would be appropriate.
On the more tenuous challenges on due process and non-delegation
grounds, the precedents were few. If most interpreted the absence of
supporting precedent in these areas as signaling that the challenges
should fail, a respectable number of judges found otherwise without
making patently illegitimate or frivolous arguments. The Guidelines
cases thus provide a good test of our signaling theory.
The first district court to consider the constitutional questions is-
sued its ruling on January 25, 1988; the last to do so issued its ruling
on December 19, 1988. During this time, two cases reached the cir-
cuit courts of appeal, which split. The Ninth Circuit invalidated the
Guidelines in August 1988 and the Third Circuit sustained the Guide-
lines in November 1988. 47 The constitutionality of the Guidelines
was settled by the Supreme Court on January 18, 1989 in Mistretta v.
United States,48 when the Court upheld the Guidelines 8-1 against
the nondelegation and separation of powers arguments. (The due pro-
cess claims were not before the Court; every circuit court of appeals
has since rejected the due process claims.49 ) The sole dissenting voice
on the Court was Justice Scalia, a Reagan appointee.
V. DATA
During 1988, 293 judges rendered 294 decisions on the constitution-
ality of the Sentencing Guidelines.50 Of these, 115 (39.1%) found the
Guidelines constitutional and 179 (60.9%) found the Guidelines un-
constitutional.5'
We constructed the database by starting with a list of decisions com-
piled by the Sentencing Commission staff from the attorneys who par-
47 Gubeiensio-Ortiz v Kanahele, 857 F2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom,
United States v Chavez-Sanchez, 488 US 1036 (1989); United States v Frank, 864 F2d
992 (3rd Cir 1988).
41 Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361 (1989).
49 See Sisk, Heise & Morriss, 73 NYU L Rev at 1458-1459, n 297 (cited in note 3).
-) The slightly larger number of opinions than judges stems from one judge's is-
suance of two opinions on the constitutionality of the Guidelines, ruling both that
they were constitutional and that they were unconstitutional. We included both of the
opinions. Where judges issued later opinions simply repeating their earlier conclu-
sions in a new case, we did not count the later opinions. Cohen used a dataset of 196
judicial decisions. Cohen, 7 J L, Econ, & Org at 190 (cited in note 4).
-1 Our dataset for this paper draws on the dataset used in the previous study and ben-
efits from the discovery of two additional written opinions that were previously coded
as oral decisions and hence reported only the outcome.
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ticipated in the cases and telephone surveys of courts.5 2 We then sup-
plemented this with research on LEXIS and WESTLAW, the comput-
erized databases of judicial opinions. The Sentencing Commission
kindly provided us with copies of all decisions of which they had
copies. The texts of additional written decisions were located through
the online databases and through correspondence with courts.5 3
Three kinds of decisions existed in our universe of 294 decisions.5 4
First, some judges (98) issued individual, written opinions-the usual
form of a district court decision on a substantive motion. Second, some
judges (90) joined in opinions issued by other district judges through
ad hoc joint proceedings. Although unusual for district courts, this
resembles the practice of appellate judges who sit in multi-judge pan-
els. For these judges we coded the outcome and the grounds of the de-
cision dependent variables, but not the reasoning method dependent
variables (e.g. originalism). Third, some judges (105) issued oral opin-
ions or simply ruled on the issues in a conclusory fashion without in-
dicating how or why they reached their decisions. These judges were
coded only on the outcome dependent variable. Two of the three of us
then read each opinion independently and coded it for the style of rea-
soning, the grounds for the decision, and so forth.5
We also used a wide range of background variables whose selection
was dictated by the existing literature on empirical analysis of judi-
cial decisionmaking including: sex, race, and prior employment ex-
perience in a variety of government and legal positions. We used these
variables to ensure we controlled for hypothesized effects. We relied
on a wide range of published and other sources to compile back-
ground information on the judges, described in detail in our prior pa-
per.5 6 Because the age of the district judge may also be a factor in eli-
gibility for promotion to the court of appeals, we have included judges
who have taken senior status based upon age and seniority in our
52 The dataset is described in detail in our earlier paper. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, 73
NYU L Rev at 1417-34 (cited in note 3). Accordingly this paper gives only the highlights.
53 We were ultimately unable to obtain copies of opinions for only two judges for
whom the records indicate written decisions existed.
-4 We excluded three judges from the database: (1) a district judge from the Virgin Is-
lands for whom crucial data was either unavailable or nonexistent because of his loca-
tion; (2) a district judge who was included in the Commission's database but whose
opinion turned out to not be about the constitutional issues; and (3) a court of appeals
judge who ruled as a district court judge sitting by designation, whose position made
it impossible to calculate the promotion potential.
-1 Anticipating disagreements, we had established an elaborate mechanism involv-
ing the third coauthor and colleagues to resolve any disagreements. We discovered that
this was unnecessary since we had no disagreements that required a third party to re-
solve. This unexpected level of agreement on the coding gives us additional confidence
that our codings were not based on subjective readings.
56 Sisk, Heise & Morriss, 73 NYU L Rev at 1417-23 (cited in note 3).
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analysis, assigning them the lowest promotion-potential score, as a
point of comparison. 7 We could not directly include the age of dis-
trict judges as a variable because introducing age and seniority to-
gether, which are highly correlated, would cause serious multi-
collinearity problems. Seniority was chosen over age for two reasons.
First, we wished to maintain comparability with earlier work by our-
selves and Cohen. Second, we had hypothesized that seniority, which
would indicate greater experience under the pre-Guidelines sentenc-
ing practice, might predict a higher degree of intensity of feeling,
which might be a factor in the decision to write.
Three sets of new variables appear for the first time in this paper.
First, we added an additional dependent variable, whether the deci-
sion was written or not, to test our signaling hypothesis. We coded a
decision as written for all signing judges. 8 Second, we added addi-
tional variables measuring precedent, both in different ways (national
vs. circuit, theory vs. outcome) and with different implementations.
Third, we added additional variables measuring promotion potential
in different ways to provide additional tests of our earlier results.
In our earlier work with this data set we found six main results., 9
One of the strongest results in both our previous study, and Cohen's,
was the significance of variables measuring the potential for promo-
tion to the circuit court of appeals. (See below for a discussion of how
s7 Id at 1426-27 (cited in note 3).
" We chose to code in this fashion for two reasons. First, district judges do not gen-
erally issue joint opinions. By signing a joint opinion, as opposed to simply issuing an
oral ruling from the bench or an order following another judge's opinion, the signing
judges went beyond both normal practice and what was necessary to resolve the issue,
something we saw as consistent with our signaling model. Unlike appellate panels,
where judges might sometimes accede to a colleague's point of view as a courtesy or in
exchange for a concession elsewhere due to the repeated nature of appellate dealings,
the extraordinary nature and likely singular occurrence of a joint district court opin-
ion suggested both a deeper level of agreement and a desire to communicate joint views
on the ultimate question presented. Second, we are measuring only the theory used to
evaluate the Guidelines (e.g. due process, separation of powers, and nondelegation),
not the judicial philosophy. We thought it implausible that a judge would sign off on
an opinion on one of these fundamental issues without an intent to make his or her
views on the subject known, while a judge might accept a colleague's reliance on, for
example, citations to The Federalist Papers even if the signing judge would have been
able to resolve the question without resort to those materials. We did not separately
analyze opinion joiners and opinion writers because the decision to join rather than
write was often affected by the separate decisions of districts on whether or not to is-
sue a joint opinion. Those decisions were so idiosyncratic that breaking them into sep-
arate subgroups reduced the data set size to below usable levels.
s9 Cohen's results, although done before ours, come from only a part of the data set
we used and only one of the dependent variables we used. See Cohen, 7 J L, Econ, &
Org 183 (cited in note 4). In general his results are consistent with ours. We will not
therefore discuss his results separately except where they differed from ours.
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we constructed this variable.) Both studies found promotion poten-
tial strongly influenced judges to uphold the Guidelines. 60 Exploring
the results further, we also found that the influence seemed to be
largely related to judges appointed by Democrats. 61 This result made
sense to us because judges appointed by Democrats were more likely
to anticipate promotion in a new Democratic administration. Since
at the time most of these decisions were issued, Michael Dukakis
(who supported the Guidelines) appeared to be the most likely suc-
cessor to President Reagan, and since the Reagan administration was
sharply and publicly divided over the Guidelines, Republican ap-
pointed judges would be unsure of what signal to send.
A second strong result in our analysis of outcome was the influ-
ence of precedent from other district courts on outcome. (See below
for a description of how we measured it.) At the time of the district
court opinions there was no direct, binding precedent available from
any court on the core constitutional issues. The Supreme Court opin-
ions then available, however, gave strong, although not crystal clear
signals, in several areas. On the separation of powers, the pre-1988
Supreme Court opinions from the 1970s and 1980s suggested that
the Court took a relatively formal approach to separation of powers
issues. This formal approach at least implied that the Guidelines
would be in trouble. On the nondelegation issues, that somewhat
nebulous doctrine had largely been seen as dead at the federal level
but for two dissents by then-Justice Rehnquist in 1980 and 1981 and
some academic commentary. On the due process issues, the weight
of precedent was strongly, but not conclusively, against the existence
of a right to individualized sentencing. As district court opinions ac-
cumulated, however, a body of nonbinding precedent addressing pre-
cisely the questions at issue in the cases built up. We found the num-
ber of decisions within the circuit significant in determining the
overall outcome. As we had not at that time measured the precedent
on the individual grounds, we were not able to explore the influence
of precedent on the other dependent variables.
Ideological variables (e.g. the party of the appointing president,
dummy variables for the appointing president) proved generally in-
significant with two exceptions. First, Republican appointees in gen-
eral and Reagan appointees in particular proved less likely to adopt an
originalist approach to reasoning. Second, Reagan appointees were
less likely to accept the Reagan administration's attempt to relocate
the Commission to the executive branch through judicial action.
60 Sisk, Heise & Morriss, 73 NYU L Rev at 1490 (cited in note 3); Cohen, 12 Intl Rev
L & Econ at 193-94 (cited in note 4).
61 Sisk, Heise & Morriss, 73 NYU L Rev at 1490-93 (cited in note 3).
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Although these results initially surprised us, we were ultimately con-
vinced that both reflected an overarching philosophy of judicial con-
servatism among Republican appointees. Both overturning the Guide-
lines or relocating the Commission required a strong degree of what
might be seen as judicial activism and originalist reasoning led quite
strongly to overturning the Guidelines (13 of 14 district judges who
followed the originalist approach invalidated the Guidelines, as did
two prominent originalists at the appellate level, Justice Scalia and
Judge Alex Kozinski, author of the Ninth Circuit opinion).
In general, background variables like sex, crime rate, attendance at
an elite law school, and race were largely irrelevant to determining out-
come, reasoning method, or constitutional grounds for action with two
major exceptions. First, those minority judges who found the Guide-
lines unconstitutional were significantly more likely to do so on due
process grounds than were white judges, who instead tended to find
the Guidelines unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds. Mi-
nority judges were not significantly more likely than white judges to
find the Guidelines unconstitutional overall. Second, prior employ-
ment as a criminal defense attorney proved significant in influencing
judges to strike the guidelines, an unsurprising result given the strong
negative reaction of the criminal defense bar to the SRA and the
Guidelines.62 Table 2 describes the variables and Table 3 presents de-
scriptive statistics. Table 4 gives the breakdown of outcomes. Table 5
gives summary statistics for our dependent variables. Two variables
require elaboration here: precedent and promotion potential.
We measured promotion potential through three related forms of
data. First, we calculated the ratio of circuit court judgeships to dis-
trict court judges in each state. 63 A higher ratio reflected more oppor-
tunities for potential advancement for judges from a given state. Sec-
ond, we counted the number of current vacancies in the circuit
judgeships currently reserved for each state. We counted both un-
filled seats and, separately, seats for which there was a pending nom-
ination. Third, we recorded the age of the oldest active circuit court
judge from the district judge's state. This measured, albeit imper-
fectly, the chance of a new vacancy occurring. We hypothesized that
62 Unlike Cohen, we did not find significant results for prior employment as a gov-
ernment official or, with one exception, to prior employment as a prosecutor. See Co-
hen, 7 J L, Econ, & Org 183 (cited in note 4). Other prior experience variables such as
experience as a law professor or in the military also proved insignificant in most cases.
Prior service as a state or local judge was significantly correlated with approval of the
Guidelines.
- Although circuit court positions are not formally reserved for particular states,
there is a strong tradition of allocating them among the states that make up a circuit
according to a particular pattern. The allocation does shift over time, however, and we
adjusted it based on the ratio at the time of each decision.
Andrew P. Morriss, Michael Heise, and Gregory C. Sisk 83
Table 2. Description of Independent Variables
Variable Definition
OUTCOME Judges' decision re: constitutionality of guidelines (1 =constitu-
tional)
SEX Gender (1=female)
RACE Racial or ethnic origin (1 =racial or ethnic minority)
LAW-SCHOOL Graduation from an elite law school (1 =yes)
CRIME-RATE Total state crime index (rate per 100,000 inhabitants), 1988
PARTY Political party of appointing president (1 =Republican)
PROSECUTOR Prior employment as a government prosecutor (1=yes)
DEFENSE Prior employment as a defense attorney (1 =yes)
MILITARY Prior service in military (1 =yes)
LAW-PROF Prior employment as a full-time law professor (1 =yes)
POLITICAL Prior employment in an elected or appointed political position
(l=yes)
JUDGE Prior employment as a state or local judge (1 =yes)
ABA-AQ ABA rating of "Well Qualified" or above (1 =yes)
ABA-BQ ABA rating of "Qualified/Not Qualified" or below (I =yes)
CASELOAD Total (civil + criminal) weighted caseload, per judge
SENIORITY Number of months on bench from appointment to date of decision
PROMO-POT Judicial promotion potential factor score
PREC-NAT'L Ratio of con./uncon. guidelines decisions
PREC-CIR Ratio of con./uncon. guidelines decisions within circuit
PRECSBA Ratio of con./uncon. guidelines decisions within circuit on sepa-
ration of powers grounds related to location of commission in
the judicial branch
PRECSBB Ratio of con./uncon. guidelines decisions within circuit circuit on
separation of powers grounds related to location of commission
in the judicial branch
PRECSBC Ratio of con./uncon. guidelines decisions within circuit circuit on
separation of powers grounds related to location of commission
in the judicial branch
PRECSJJ Ratio of con./uncon. guidelines decisions within circuit on sepa-
ration of powers grounds related to presence of judges on com-
mission
PRECDPA Ratio of con./uncon. guidelines decisions within circuit on due
process grounds
PRECNDD Ratio of con./uncon. guidelines decisions within circuit on non-
delegation grounds
these three variables were expressions of an underlying and unob-
served factor, the promotion potential. We therefore used factor anal-
ysis to combine these into a single variable.64 We also tested each of
these variables individually.
61 Cohen used a similar procedure in his study. Cohen, 7 J L, Econ, & Org at 192-93
(cited in note 4).
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics, Independent Variables
Variable Mean SD
OUTCOME .39 .49
SEX .1 .29
RACE .1 .29
LAW-SCHOOL .26 .44
CRIME-RATE 5983.65 1625.86
PARTY .61 .49
PROSECUTOR .41 .49
DEFENSE .13 .34
MILITARY .62 .49
LAW-PROF .04 .19
POLITICAL .1 .29
JUDGE .37 .48
ABA-AQ .51 .5
ABA-BQ .06 .25
CASELOAD 474.54 97.65
SENIORITY 113.13 80.16
PROMO-POT -.39 1.22
PREC-NAT'L -5.08 4.99
PREC-CIR -1.94 4.26
PRECSBA 2.27 4.23
PRECSBB 6.85 8.37
PRECSBC 4.25 5.62
PREC_SJJ 2.20 4.09
PREC_DPA .38 2.45
PRECNDD -2.75 6.45
For precedent, we created a series of variables that measured the
number of other judges ruling on the issue in question in the same
circuit and nationally. Although the vast majority of the precedents
discussed by the courts in the course of their opinions were Supreme
Court opinions rather than circuit court opinions, we nonetheless
measured circuit level precedent as well as national level precedent
because we believed that judges were more likely to give weight to
persuasive opinions written by the judges they knew best. We there-
fore thought that a judge in California, for example, would be more
likely to give weight to an opinion from another judge in the Ninth
Circuit than to one from a judge in the east coast Second Circuit.65
To create the precedent variables, we sorted the opinions into date
order within each circuit. We then calculated the number of judges
65 We considered, but rejected as unworkable, a within-district measure of prece-
dent because there insufficient opinions in many districts to implement it. In addition,
districts vary from the tiny to the huge, while circuits are closer to being of similar size.
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Table 4. Summary Statistics on Outcome & Whether Judge Wrote an Opinion
Con. Uncon. Write Did NotWrite (N)
Decision
Con.
Uncon.
By Sex
Male
Female
By Race/Ethnicity
White (non-Hispanic)
(other)
By Law School
Elite Law School
Non-Elite Law School
By Party of Appointing President
Republican
Democrat
By Employment
Prosecutor
Yes
No
Defense Lawyer
Yes
No
Military
Yes
No
Law Professor
Yes
No
Political Experience
Yes
No
Judge
Yes
No
By ABA Rating
Above Qualified
Qualified
Below Qualified
115 (.39)
105 (.40)
10 (.36)
107 (.40)
8 (.29)
179 (.61)
161 (.61)
18 (.64)
159 (.60)
20 (.71)
191 (.65)
64 (.56)
127 (.71)
175 (.66)
16 (.57)
170 (.64)
21 (.75)
103 (.35)
51 (.44)
52(.29)
91 (.34)
12 (.43)
96 (.36) 266
7 (.25) 28
25 (.33) 50 (.67) 43 (.57) 32 (.43) 75
90 (.41) 129 (.59) 148 (.68) 71 (.32) 219
75 (.42) 103 (.58) 114 (.64) 64 (.36) 178
40 (.35) 76 (.66) 77 (.66) 39 (.34) 116
48 (.40)
67 (.39)
10 (.26)
105 (.41)
67 (.37)
48 (.43)
3 (.27)
112 (.40)
11 (.39)
104 (.39)
49 (.45)
66 (.36)
56 (.38)
53 (.42)
6(.32)
72 (.60) 70 (.58)
107 (.62) 121 (.70)
29 (.74) 25 (.64)
150 (.59) 166 (.65)
115 (.63) 120(.66)
64 (.57) 71 (.63)
8 (.73) 8 (.73)
171 (.60) 183 (.65)
17 (.61)
162 (.61)
59 (.55)
120 (.65)
93 (.62)
72 (.58)
13 (.68)
23 (.82)
168 (.63)
73 (.68)
118 (.63)
96 (.64)
82 (.66)
12 (.63)
50(.42) 120
53(.31) 174
14 (.36)
89 (.35)
62 (.34)
41 (.37)
3 (.27)
100 (.35)
5(.18)
98 (.37)
35 (.32)
68 (.37)
53 (.36)
43 (.34)
7 (.37)
holding the Guidelines constitutional and unconstitutional at least
seven days prior to the date of each opinion. We used the seven-day
rule to allow time for the opinions to be disseminated. Because judges
sometimes ruled from the bench in Guidelines cases and then issued
their formal opinions justifying their decisions a short time later, we
also sought to ensure that we did not erroneously attribute knowledge
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Table 5. Summary Statistics on Dependent Variables
Con. Uncon. (N)
All Judges 115(.39) 179(.61) 294
Constitutional Claims
SOP-Branch Location 63(.36) 114 (.64) 177
SOP-Judge Members 60 (.35) 113 (.65) 173
Non-Delegation Doctrine 91 (.68) 42 (.32) 133
Due Process Claim 31 (.43) 42 (.58) 73
Written Opinion Yes No
191 (.65) 103 (.35) 294
of an opinion to a judge when the judge's mind had been made up
prior to the opinion's issuance. We used the number of judges rather
than the number of opinions because some courts issued multi-judge
opinions. Finally, we wanted the variable to reflect whether prior de-
cisions were strongly in one direction or not, reasoning that it would
be much more difficult to go against a larger weight of authority than
where the other judges had been more closely divided.
We therefore settled on a formula of (x - y)* Ix - yl/(x + y) where x
is the number of judges who decided at least seven days prior to the
decision that the Guidelines were constitutional on a particular
ground and y is the equivalent number deciding they were unconsti-
tutional. Thus, for example, where there were three decisions decid-
ing the guidelines were constitutional and seven deciding that they
were unconstitutional, the variable would be (3 - 7)*13 - 71/10 = -1.60.
Using the absolute value preserved the sign while allowing us to ef-
fectively square the numerator, to give greater weight to larger differ-
ences in opinions. We created fourteen precedent variables, one each
for each dependent variable by circuit and nationally. We also experi-
mented with alternative forms of measuring precedent, using ratios
of decisions rather than the formula described above.
VI. RESULTS
Our results fall into two categories and are presented in Tables 6-9.
First, we found evidence of signaling in judges' decisions to issue writ-
ten opinions. Second, while we confirmed our prior findings66 that
judges were influenced by the weight of prior District Court decisions
66 Sisk, Heise & Morriss, 73 NYU L Rev at 1496-98 (cited in note 3).
Table 6. Probability of a Written Judicial Opinion (Written Opinion = 1)
Standard
Demographic
SEX -. 76
(.51)
RACE .66
(.53)
LAW-SCHOOL -. 55
(.31)
CRIME-RATE -. 00
(8.80) (e-05)
Political
PARTY -. 02
(.31)
Prior Employment
PROSECUTOR -. 65"
(.29)
DEFENSE .16
(.42)
MILITARY -. 18
(.31)
LAW-PROF -. 07
(.75)
POLITICAL .99
(.59)
JUDGE .26
(.30)
Judicial Role or Institution
ABA-AQ .03
(.29)
ABA-BQ -. 61
J.58)
CASELOAD -1.86
(1.67)
SENIORITY .00
(.00)
Promotion Potential
PROMO-POT .26*
(.13)
Precedent
PREC-CIR
-. 06
(.03)
Outcome
DEC -. 70*
(.28)
(constant) 2.21 * *
(.79)
% accurately predicted by model 66.67
McFadden's pseudo R' .10
N 291
Table 7. Outcome Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demographic
SEX
RACE
LAW-SCHOOL
CRIME-RATE
Political
PARTY
Prior Employment
PROSECUTOR
DEFENSE
MILITARY
LAW-PROF
POLITICAL
JUDGE
Judicial Role or Institution
ABA-AQ
ABA-BQ
CASELOAD
CRIM-CASELOAD
SENIORITY
Promotion Potential
PROMO-POT
Precedent
CIRCUIT PRECEDENT*
NATIONAL PRECEDENT'
(constant)
% accurately predicted
by model
McFadden's pseudo R
2
N
-. 56
(.50)
-. 68
(.50)
-. 17
(.31)
-2.5 (e-05)
(8.35) (e-05)
.24
(.29)
.25
(.28)
-. 75
(.43)
-. 28
(.30)
-. 53
(.72)
.12
(.45)
.62"
(.28)
-. 19
(.27)
-. 59
(.58)
-. 00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.29"
(.12)
.07"
(.03)
.49
(.99)
63.92
.06
291
-. 53
(.51)
-. 72
(.50)
-. 11
(.32)
-7.7 (e-05)
(8.89) (e-05)
.20
(.29)
.30
(.28)
-. 90"
(.44)
-. 34
(.30)
-.49
(.73)
.14
(.45)
.60"
(.28)
-. 18
(.27)
-. 58
(.59)
3.42'
(1.64)
.00
(.00)
.25"
(.12)
.07"
(.03)
-. 30
(.73)
68.04
.07
291
-.65
(.50)
-.60
(.50)
-.29
(.31)
-2.9 (e-05)
(8.36) (e-05)
.16
(.29)
.16
(.27)
-. 73
(.43)
-.34
(.29)
-.56
(.72)
-. 00
(.45)
.58*
(.27)
-. 13
(.27)
-. 49
(.58)
-. 00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.30"
(.13)
-. 63
(.50)
-. 64
(.50)
-. 23
(.31)
-7.5 (e-05)
(8.83) (e-05)
.12
(.29)
.23
(.28)
-. 85
(.44)
-. 40
(.30)
-. 52
(.73)
.02
(.45)
.55 *
(.27)
-. 13
(.27)
-. 48
(.59)
3.23'
(1.64)
.00
(.00)
.29'
(.13)
-. 02 -. 03
(.03) (.03)
.16 -. 41
(1.01) (.76)
63.45 65.17
.05 .06
290 290
.p <.05; ** p <.01.
'Definition of variable based upon dependent variable; values differ across columns.
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Table 9. Nondelegation & Due Process Challenges Results
Nondelegation Theory Due Process Theory
Demographic
SEX
RACE
LAW-SCHOOL
CRIME-RATE
Political
PARTY
Prior Employment
PROSECUTOR
DEFENSE
MILITARY
LAW-PROF
POLITICAL
JUDGE
Judicial Role or Institution
ABA-AQ
ABA-BQ
CASELOAD
CRIM-CASELOAD
SENIORITY
Promotion Potential
PROMO-POT
Precedent
CIRCUIT PRECEDENT*
NATIONAL PRECEDENT'
(constant)
% accurately predicted
by model
McFadden's pseudo R2
N
-. 17
(1.03)
-. 13
(.98)
-. 31
(.54)
-6.1 (e-05)
(.00)
.16
(.51)
-. 76
(.50)
-. 37
(.72)
-. 70
(.58)
7.20
(23.63)
.13
(.66)
.42
(.51)
-. 93
(.49)
-1.85
(1.13)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
*97**(.29)
-. 12
(.07)
1.53
(2.17)
79.70
-1.06
(1.10)
-. 38
(1.03)
-. 71
J.59)
-7.6 (e-05)
(.00)
.56
(.58)
.92
(.55)
_24
(.73)
-. 76
(.62)
8.08
(22.50)
.40
(.76)
.74
(.55)
-1.67
(.57)
-2.85
(1.25)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
.94
(.32)
-. 17
(.05)
4.14
(2.47)
78.20
1.37
(1.51)
-3.91 * *
(1.49)
-1.49
(.92)
-. 00
(.00)
.15
(.91)
.50
(.72)
-3.34*
(1.50)
.15
(.74)
1.40
(1.67)
-. 77
(1.92)
.43
(.71)
-1.44"
(.72)
.08
1.35
.01
(.01)
-. 01
(.01)
.07
(.37)
-. 02
(.14)
-. 50
(3.16)
76.71
1.30
(1.51)
-3.83 * *
(1.49)
-1.44
(.89)
-. 00
(.00)
.23
(.93)
.59
(.72)
-3.39
(1.50)
.17
(.74)
1.39
(1.66)
-. 23
(1.83)
.40
(.71)
-1.35
(.72)
.30
(1.40)
.01
(.01)
-. 01
(.01)
-. 09
(.41)
-. 07
(.08)
-. 49
(3.16)
76.71
.34
*p <.05; ** p <.01.
,Definition of variable based upon dependent variable; values differ across columns.
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one way or the other on the Guidelines within a circuit, that persua-
sive precedent effect on the general outcome did not extend to a per-
suasive precedent effect on the individual doctrinal issues raised in
these cases. Thus, once we have understood persuasive precedential
weight in a more nuanced way, the importance of signaling as an ex-
planatory theory here is reinforced.
A. Signals
Table 6 gives the results for the regression evaluating the decision to
write. Three variables were significant: greater promotion potential
increased the likelihood of writing, a decision that the guidelines
were constitutional decreased the likelihood of writing, and back-
ground as a criminal prosecutor decreased the likelihood of writing.
The results with respect to promotion potential are consistent
with our hypothesis that written opinions serve as a signal to ap-
pointing authorities. In high profile cases like these, judges' opinions
and decisions were certain to be closely scrutinized. Moreover, be-
cause of the relative vagueness of the existing Supreme Court prece-
dent, how a judge dealt with the issues in these cases was a particu-
larly good signal. Finally, the gain in judicial utility from creating a
precedent was zero, or close to it, because of the certainty of Supreme
Court review. While we cannot eliminate the possibility that writing
an opinion in these cases may have been more exciting or pleasurable
than, say, writing one on a routine discovery matter, the nature of the
opinions supports the signaling hypothesis.
A constitutional decision was less likely to produce a written opin-
ion than an unconstitutional decision-a reassuring result. Judges
ought to be more likely to explain their reasoning when they strike a
statute as unconstitutional, particularly a statute as important as the
Sentencing Reform Act. This result is also consistent with the sig-
naling hypothesis. A decision upholding the guidelines sends a fairly
clear signal by itself-the judge has rejected all the grounds for chal-
lenging the statute. A decision to strike the guidelines, on the other
hand, does not send a clear signal. A judge might agree, for example,
with one of the separation of powers challenges to the SRA but not
with the due process or nondelegation doctrine challenges. Given the
relative theoretical pedigrees of the theories, explaining his or her
views about the merits of each of the challenges could be an important
means of clarifying the signal. Indeed, we observed precisely this be-
havior in some of the opinions: judges upheld the SRA on one ground
but struck it on another. The results concerning former prosecutors'
decreased likelihood of writing do not have a natural explanation.
Also interesting is what was not significant: none of our demo-
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graphic, political, or other variables produced significant results. In
some cases this is surprising. For example, former law professors
ought, at least according to our experience, to be expected to be more
likely to write. Similarly, graduates of elite law schools or those with
higher ABA ratings might be thought more likely to wish to share
their thoughts with the world than those from lesser schools or with
lower ABA ratings.
B. Precedent
Although the overall level of support for the guidelines within the cir-
cuit was significant in predicting the outcome, the individual doctri-
nal precedents were insignificant, except in the somewhat puzzling
case of the judicial branch location theory where they exercised a
negative influence. Cohen, who used a different measure of precedent
and a subset of the data used here, found that the presence of one or
more prior unconstitutional decisions in the same judicial district
was related to a negative constitutional outcome.67 At the same time,
however, he found that a ratio of constitutional to unconstitutional
decisions in the district was not significant.68 Cohen's explanation
was that the politically safe decision was to uphold the guidelines un-
til a colleague provided political cover.69
Our interpretation of the results differs from Cohen's. Voting to
strike the guidelines as unconstitutional was not a particularly polit-
ically risky decision. The Reagan Administration, as noted above, was
divided over the constitutionality of the Guidelines and was forced to
argue that plain language in the statute about branch location was
merely precatory and should be ignored by the judges, a step that
could be seen as demanding a high degree of judicial activism. Al-
though Michael Dukakis, the actual or presumed Democratic presi-
dential candidate and presumed next president for much of the pe-
riod in question, had endorsed the Guidelines, they were not a policy
closely identified with him. Upholding the guidelines might curry fa-
vor with an incoming-Dukakis administration but was unlikely to
make or break a judge's relationship with the new administration.70
Moreover, if political cover were the issue, it should matter what
theory the other judges acted on. Both the nondelegation and due pro-
cess claims required judges to take actions out of the judicial main-
stream. No statute had been struck by the federal courts on nondele-
67 Cohen, 7 J L, Econ, & Org at 195-96 (cited in note 4).
68 Id at 194-96.
69 Id at 196.
70 An opinion under such circumstances allowed the judge to signal his or her
broader judicial philosophy more clearly than the result standing alone would.
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gation grounds since the New Deal, for example. Further, both the
nondelegation and due process theories relied heavily on completely
untested interpretations of the constitution. For example, the non-
delegation argument relied on a theory of a nondelegable duty in
Congress to set sentencing ranges as well as the more "conventional"
nondelegation doctrine articulated in the 1930s. Even the Reagan Ad-
ministrations position encouraged what could be viewed as judicial
activism to save the Guidelines, an approach that might, at least for
conservative jurists, make judges wish for political cover, yet our re-
sults were significantly negative in that analysis. Issue-specific prece-
dent variables testing that theory were not significant, however.
Thus, where the decision required more political cover, going out on
a limb to relocate the Commission to the executive branch or to
strike it as unconstitutional on the non-delegation or due process
grounds, we found no evidence of an impact in the hypothesized di-
rection. Political cover, therefore, does not appear to be a meaningful
interpretation of the role of precedent in these cases.
Perhaps the relatively unique nature of the legal questions pre-
sented by these cases offers the best explanation. The issues con-
fronting the judges in these cases were ones that turned on how to read
a limited universe of Supreme Court precedents and other materials,
such as the Federalist Papers and other Founding documents. Decid-
ing the issues required the judges to come to grips with that set of ma-
terials, regardless of whether or how they read other judges' interpre-
tations of the materials. Once having come to grips with the original
materials, however, there was little reason to rely on another's inter-
pretation. A judge who had worked through whether he thought, for
example, that the participation of judges on the commission ren-
dered it unconstitutional would have thought through the issues suf-
ficiently well that the "weight" of district court precedent on the
point would not be likely to have much influence. Rather the role of
the other district courts' opinions was just what it should be in a sys-
tem of persuasive precedent: an opinion would persuade the judge to
consider a particular argument about how to interpret the agreed
sources and prompt him to consider the sources independently.
Finally, in the sentencing guidelines context, it was apparent to all
early on that the key and most practical question simply was whether
the guidelines were constitutional or not. The answer to this ques-
tion dictated how sentencing would be conducted until the Supreme
Court resolved the question. The desire to be in step with one's peers
that Cohen hypothesizes would express itself most strongly on the
overall outcome rather than the specific grounds. Thus it is under-
standable, and perhaps even to be expected, that judges would take
primary notice of the overall breakdown between prior decisions that
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held the guidelines constitutional versus unconstitutional. It also
suggests that the manner in which a judge takes notice of precedent
on some questions at least, or perhaps how precedent filters into the
judge's mind, is likely to be at a broader level rather than at a deep an-
alytical level.
This comports with the nature of the constraint imposed by prece-
dent. If a precedent requires deep thought to understand, it is either
not clearly written or is ambiguous in its dictates. It would not, there-
fore, function as a binding constraint. A clear precedent from a higher
court, on the other hand, is straightforward to apply.
This use of precedent is consistent with the results we found (al-
though the results are undoubtedly consistent with other theories
as well). Additional opinions, particularly by judges from the same
circuit and so likely known to the writer, would be useful in suggest-
ing lines of inquiry to be pursued while reading the Supreme Court
precedents and Founding documents. Thus more opinions tending in
one direction would influence indirectly the conclusions of judges
coming to the overall question later. The weight of decisions on par-
ticular points, however, would not be something that would deter-
mine the later judge's reasoning-that would be something reached
through his or her independent analysis of the materials.
This analysis fits the use of precedent in the opinions. Only a few
judges wrote opinions simply adopting other judges' analyses. Most
judges who wrote, wrote their own opinions in which they acknowl-
edged points made by other judges, noted district court precedent
that agreed or disagreed, but resolved the question by a focus on the
primary sources. Again, this style of opinion is inconsistent with the
political cover explanation suggested by Cohen's results. Judges who
wanted cover could hardly hope for a better position than to simply
adopt another's opinion. Judges who wanted cover would also be ex-
pected to rely more heavily on arguments based on the increasing
percentage of judges opting to hold the guidelines unconstitutional,
a form of argument relatively rare in the opinions.
Finally, a persuasive precedent approach is consistent with the be-
havior of the judges in writing the opinions. Judges clearly cared
deeply about the sentencing guidelines and the constitutional issues
they raised. Their approach to the opinions was largely a thoughtful
and reasoned one-we encountered few frivolous arguments and few
poorly written opinions. It is unlikely that the judges thought the
Supreme Court would pay close attention to their written opinions,
although there was a chance that the overwhelming "vote" against
the guidelines by district judges, who manned the front lines on sen-
tencing, would influence the Court. They wrote, therefore, to per-
suade their colleagues on the district court bench and, perhaps, to
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document their position on the issues raised by the Guidelines that
struck so close to home for the judges.
This leaves us with the one case where the new doctrinal precedent
variable proved significant and negative: the issue of whether the
Commission could be constitutionally located in the judicial branch
of government. At the risk of explaining the inexplicable, our expla-
nation of this result is as follows. In general we found that many of the
district judges resented the Guidelines as an intrusion on their inde-
pendence. This resentment showed itself most strongly in their reac-
tion to the Sentencing Commission's argument that the Commission
was part of the judicial branch rather than an outside imposition.7
Thus when confronted with a district court taking both the minority
position that the Guidelines were constitutional and the even smaller
minority position that the Commission was part of the judiciary,
judges were directly reminded of everything they disliked about the
Commission and the Guidelines. Thus a pro-Commission opinion
on branch location was a potent "in your face" symbol that provoked
greater resistance.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Our results yield insights in both the areas of the impact of opinions
as signals and the role of precedent. Signaling appears to be a viable
explanation for the decision to write in at least some circumstances
and further work is needed to identify its role more completely. We
also continue to find significant results in general for our promotion
potential variable with our augmented dataset and more thorough
controls for precedent. Together with Cohen's earlier papers, this re-
sult suggests a need for closer attention to the opportunity for "ad-
vancement" within the judiciary as an influence on judicial decision-
making. First, we need a better measure of promotion potential
capable of focusing on those judges who indeed desire it or are con-
sidered eligible for it. Second, given that the findings here and in Co-
hen's papers deal with federal judges who are relatively insulated from
the chances for promotion, those state judges who are elected are ob-
vious candidates for further study in this regard.
71 This resentment showed itself in a number of ways. One of us was told by the
Commission staff that they experienced difficulty in getting judges to report sentenc-
ing data to the Commission as required by law and that judges refused to concede that
the Commission was in the judicial branch in the way that the Administrative Office
is. Judges' protective instincts sometimes even extended to the AO-another of us has
heard of judges refusing to attend sessions at the mandatory circuit conferences in the
1980s or submit statistical forms to the AO on the grounds that neither of these things
are mentioned in Article III of the Constitution.
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With respect to precedent, we have taken the first steps toward em-
pirically identifying the manner in which precedent acts, at least in
this type of case. Precedent is likely to have different impacts in dif-
ferent areas of the law (fact dependent, multi-factor balancing tests
vs. bright line rules) and at different levels of the court system.
Nonetheless, it appears to be significant at the level one might sus-
pect is least likely to matter: among judges of the same level and who
are not bound to pay attention to it.

